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Recent work has found that the behavior of an individual can be altered when infected by a
parasite. Here we explore the question: under what conditions, in principle, can a general para-
sitic infection control system-wide social behaviors? We analyze fixed points and hysteresis effects
under the Master Equation, with transitions between two behaviors given two different subpopula-
tions, healthy vs. parasitically-infected, within a population which is kept fixed overall. The key
model choices are: (i) the internal opinion of infected humans may differ from that of the healthy
population, (ii) the extent that interaction drives behavioral changes may also differ, and (iii) in-
direct interactions are most important. We find that the socioconfiguration can be controlled by
the parasitically-infected population, under some conditions, even if the healthy population is the
majority and of opposite opinion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Parasitic organisms, those which feed upon their hosts
or use the hosts to obtain resources or to reproduce, often
employ behavior-altering strategies such that the behav-
ior of the infected host benefits the parasite more than
the behavior of a healthy host[6, 14, 21, 22, 25, 36]. We
use the term “parasite” for any organism or virus taking
residence in or on a host organism and evincing such a
behavior-altering property during one or more stages of
its life cycle. Examples of these parasites are plentiful,
ranging from viruses of the family Baculoviridae (which
affect caterpillars) to the fluke Dicrocoelium dendriticum
(which affects ants).
In particular, research within the past two decades
has uncovered significant influences on the behavior of
various hosts from the protozoan parasite Toxoplasma
gondii . The infection, toxoplasmosis, has an acute phase
followed by a latent (dormant) phase which can re-
main indefinitely. The latent phase of infection has
no overt symptoms but significant behavioral differ-
ences have been observed, including examples in hu-
mans ranging from the occurrence of traffic accidents to
entrepreneurship[6, 7, 15, 19, 35].
Extrapolating from the established behavioral changes
of infected individuals, conjectures have been made about
the ultimate implications for human activity and culture
on a societal level[17, 21, 36]. While it is clear that there
should be significant macroscopic behavioral effects while
the infected population holds the majority, the extent of
macroscopic changes due to modest infected populations
has not been assessed with mathematical rigor. Specifi-
cally, it is not clear if the role of social interactions will
inhibit or exacerbate the aberrant behavior of infected
individuals. We explore these macroscopic behavioral ef-
fects due to parasitic infection of some fraction of a large
population of interacting individuals.
We consider a very general and simple model (Sec. II)
which is not limited to any particular parasite or host, al-
though one may keep in mind the prototypical example
of T. gondii in humans. The population of host indi-
viduals is assumed to be very large, with each labelled
according to their infection status and behavioral choice.
Furthermore, the behavioral choice is assumed to be bi-
nary, which can be interpreted as a yes/no response or
a two-party selection. One detail which is not addressed
here is that behavioral changes from parasitic infection
can depend on gender[18].
In Sec. III we explore the behavioral dynamics with
the infected population having an opposite behavioral
preference to that of the healthy population, having a
different inclination to agree with the majority behavior,
and the combination of both of these together. In ad-
dition to the case of static parameters (Sec. III A) we
consider the effects of time-varying parameters, namely
the generational variations of opinions (specifying behav-
ioral preferences) of healthy individuals (Sec. III B) and
oscillations of the infected population as prevalence of
the parasite in question varies over time (Sec. III C).
II. MODEL DETAILS
We employ the Master Equation and approach the
thermodynamic limit with a Fokker-Planck Equation, a
method well-known from sociodynamics to produce reli-
able results[3, 4, 11–13, 26, 29–34]. We consider an over-
all population consisting of a fixed number of individuals,
N . The population is then divided into two subpopula-
tions: “healthy” individuals (free of the parasite in ques-
tion) denoted by NA, and “infected” individuals denoted
by NB : N = NA + NB . Each is split into two parts
corresponding to the binary behavioral choices, labelled
j = 1, 2:
Nµ = nµ,1 + nµ,2 for µ = A, B
N =
∑
µ=A,B
∑
j=1,2
nµ,j . (1)
The state of each individual is fully specified by the pair
(µ, j), and the resulting socioconfiguration by the popu-
lation in each state, nµ,j .
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2A. Key Definitions
The Master Equation governs the evolution of the
probability distribution and involves transitions of indi-
viduals between the four states (µ, j). Transitions be-
tween subpopulations, A ↔ B, represent infection and
cure processes which can be complex in nature and one-
sided (dormant parasites may remain indefinitely)[28].
This means the long-term configuration is largely infected
unless birth/death processes are taken into account. To
keep the model simple and investigate a range of infected
populations, we reserve the ratio x = (NA −NB) /N as
a controlled parameter. Beginning with the four inde-
pendent populations, nµ,j , we have introduced two con-
straints, N and x, so two degrees of freedom remain. One
of these is related to the difference of opinions y, while
the other is a cross-difference z. With Eqs. (1) we recast
the four populations nµ,j as the four variables,
N = nA,1 + nA,2 + nB,1 + nB,2
x =
1
N
(nA,1 + nA,2 − nB,1 − nB,2)
y =
1
N
(nA,1 − nA,2 + nB,1 − nB,2)
z =
1
N
(nA,1 − nA,2 − nB,1 + nB,2) ,
(2)
where only the last two enter as dynamic variables. The
variable N ∈ R+ has discrete spacing ∆N = 1. The
others x, y, z ∈ Γ, on the interval [−1, 1], have steps of
δx, δy, δz = 2/N ≡ ε.
The configurational Master Equation then reads
d
dt
P (y, z; t) =
∑
y′,z′∈Γ
[
wz←z
′
y←y′(y
′, z′)P (y′, z′; t)
− wz′←zy′←y(y, z)P (y, z; t)
]
.
(3)
Considering only individual transitions, nµ,j → nµ,j ± 1,
Eqs. (2) imply z′ = z±δz and y′ = y±δy. The four rates
wz
′←z
y′←y are related to the individual transition pobabili-
ties pµ′j′←µj , obtained by multiplying by the appropriate
subpopulation, e.g.
wz+δz←zy+δy←y = nA,2 pA1←A2 =
N
4
(1+x−y−z) pA1←A2 . (4)
Individuals in our model perceive (and are influenced
by) the net behavior y but cannot perceive (or don’t care
about) the relative population x or the cross-difference z.
Using an approach related to utility functions and focus-
ing on indirect interactions, we denote the internal opin-
ions (specifying behavioral preferences) of healthy and
infected populations as α and β, respectively, the incli-
nations to behave like the majority as κA and κB , and
the rates of interaction as νA and νB . The four individual
transition probabilities per unit time are then written as:
pA1←A2(y) = νAeα+κAy , pA2←A1(y) = νAe−α−κAy
pB1←B2(y) = νBeβ+κBy , pB2←B1(y) = νBe−β−κBy .
(5)
B. Mean-Field Drift Equations
The Fokker-Planck formulation follows from the ther-
modynamic limit, N  1 and each nµ,j  1, where the
step size ε 1 allows for dynamical variables to be made
continuous: δy, δz → dy, dz with y, z ∈ Γ → [−1, 1].
Specifically, it can be obtained via Taylor expansion for
(y′, z′) ≈ (y, z) carried out to second order on the r.h.s.
of Eq. (3). Drift is related to terms of first order in ε,
leading to rescaled effective transition rates: W z±δz←zy±δy←y ≡
εwz±δz←zy±δy←y [10, 33]. Fluctuation dynamics are related to
the second order terms ∼ ε2wz±δz←zy±δy←y = εW z±δz←zy±δy←y .
Thus, fluctuations are minimized by assuming a sharp
unimodal initial distribution and taking a large N ∼
1/ε [4]. Alongside the fact that pair-wise and higher
interactions are ignored, we can safely use the low-
est order mean-value equations to assess the dynamics
of this system rather than using the full distribution
P (y, z; t)[3, 13]. Evolutions of the mean values 〈y〉t =∫
Γ2
dy dz y P (y, z; t) ≡ y(t), and similarly 〈z〉t ≡ z(t), are
then governed by the mean-field drift equations, obtained
by integrating the Fokker-Planck expansion of Eq. (3):
d
dt
y(t) = Ky(y, z) ,
d
dt
z(t) = Kz(y, z) . (6)
The drift coefficients are given by
Ky =
∑
m=±1
(
W z+mδz←zy+δy←y −W z+mδz←zy−δy←y
)
Kz =
∑
m=±1
(
W z+δz←zy+mδy←y −W z−δz←zy+mδy←y
)
,
(7)
which can be written together as
Ky/z(y, z) = νAf+(y, z;α, κA)± νBf−(y, z;β, κB) (8)
where
f±(y, z; η, κ) = (1±x) sinh(η+κy)−(y±z) cosh(η+κy) .
(9)
III. RESULTS
From Eqs. (5) and the control of the relative popu-
lation x, the system is controlled by seven independent
parameters. The two parameters, νA and νB , govern the
rates at which social interactions take place. Since indi-
rect interactions may be expected to occur with approx-
imately equal frequency regardless of infection status we
will set νA = νB ≡ ν, and without further loss of gen-
erality we scale time so that ν = 1. The solutions of
Eqs. (6) are assessed in various regions of the remaining
parameter-space: (α, β, κA, κB , x) ∈ R4 × Γ ≡ S.
We typically take β < α and κB < κA, i.e. the
healthy population A more strongly prefers behavior 1,
and more strongly seeks uniformity in behavior, than the
3infected population B. Taking distinct parameter values
for healthy and infected subpopulations is the key ele-
ment for the investigation of possible effects of parasites
on the macroscopic socioconfiguration, y.
With all static parameters (Sec. III A), at least one
stable equilibrium (y∗, z∗) is guaranteed, corresponding
to a peak in the stationary distribution P0(y, z) [1, 10,
13, 33]. When one personal parameter is allowed to vary
(Sec. III B), the effects of a static relative population are
combined with those of a varying personal trait.
If the relative population x varies on shorter time-
scales than oscillations of personal opinions, then the lat-
ter can be considered static parameters (Sec. III C). This
possibility allows for non-standard hysteresis effects: the
socioconfiguration at one time may be decided by the
relative population that existed at some earlier time.
We consider several cases with dynamically varying pa-
rameters driving macroscopic behavioral changes, in an
attempt to probe the large parameter space.
A. Static Parameters
The simplest case of static parameters refers to a single
point in S. According to the drifts, Eqs. (6) with Eqs.
(8) and (9), we find the fixed points
y∗ =
1
2
[(1 + x) tanh(α+ κAy
∗) + (1− x) tanh(β + κBy∗)]
z∗ = (1 + x) tanh(α+ κAy∗)− y∗.
(10)
The cross-difference reaches a fixed point z∗ completely
determined by that of the behavior y∗. This justifies
focusing on the behavior y in the following, and the cross-
difference z can be inferred from Eqs. (10) if desired
(approximately, when a parameter is oscillating).
The transcendental form of Eqs. (10) makes the fixed
points analytically inaccessible. However, it is clear that
the number of fixed points is 1, 2, or 3; up to two will
be stable. A transition occurs as the r.h.s. of Eq. (10)
intersects the l.h.s. tangentially, where a new fixed point
emerges or switches stability. If the emerging fixed point
is small, y∗ ≈ 0, we find a transition condition
(1 + x) sech2(α)κA + (1− x) sech2(β)κB = 2 . (11)
The original fixed point, (y∗, z∗) = (0, 0) if β =
−α and x = 0, becomes unstable when the l.h.s. of
Eq. (11) surpasses 2, giving rise to a pair of stable fixed
points away from (0, 0) despite the counter-acting indi-
vidual opinions. This is reminiscent of typical symmetry-
breaking transitions, e.g. a net magnetization arises (in
a direction governed by the initial condition) when the
coupling parameter crosses a critical value[16].
Like many symmetry-breaking transitions it is marked
by a pitchfork bifurcation, which can be found by numer-
ically solving Eqs. (6) and extracting the fixed points for
different initial conditions[27]. When the populations are
balanced, x = 0, with neutral opinions, Eq. (11) predicts
FIG. 1: Phase diagram: the fixed point y∗ shown as a func-
tion of the interaction parameter κA. The other interaction
is not fixed but follows κB = κA/2, while the remaining pa-
rameters are: x = 0, α = −β ∈ {0, 0.4, 0.8}. Asymmetric
bifurcations arise from unequal interactions with polar opin-
ions: fixed points favoring behavior 2 (y∗ < 0) appear as
healthy individuals adapt to the status quo due to κA, while
those favoring behavior 1 (y∗ & 0) rely on infected individuals
falling in line due to κB .
a transition near κA + κB = 2. If infected individuals
only consider interactions favoring behavior 2, with the
same weight as healthy individuals consider either inter-
action, then κB = κA/2 and the transition occurs near
κA = 4/3. This is confirmed by numerical calculation,
as seen in Fig. 1. The boundary near κA + κB = 2 is
revealed more generally by allowing both parameters to
vary independently, shown in Fig. 2.
Bifurcations for opposite opinions α = −β 6= 0 are
numerically found to occur at different values of κA, the
shift toward behavior 1 (y∗ > 0) relying upon transitions
of the infected subpopulation via κB . The critical value
predicted by Eq. (11) corresponds to the emerging fixed
point y∗ & 0, leading to κA ≈ 1.56 for α = −β = 0.4 and
κA ≈ 2.38 for α = −β = 0.8 (with κB = κA/2), and is
preceded by the emergence of the fixed point y∗ < 0 as
seen in Fig. 1. The condition for these latter fixed points
is not analytically available because they originate from
tangential intersections of the l.h.s. and r.h.s. of Eq.
(10) away from y∗ = 0. Phase diagrams like Fig. 2
for opposite opinions merely have a shifted offset of the
transition line with the slope unaffected, while those for
imbalanced populations x 6= 0 can be more complex.
4FIG. 2: Behavior y∗ as a function of the interaction pa-
rameters κA, κB , for initial conditions y(0) < 0 (left) and
y(0) > 0 (right). Here: x = 0, α = β = 0. The dashed
line shows κA + κB = 2. With sufficiently strong interactions
κA +κB > 2, behavior 2 dominates for y(0) < 0 while behav-
ior 1 dominates for y(0) > 0.
[An interpolation is applied between fixed points y∗(κA, κB)
on a discrete 10× 10 grid.]
B. Oscillating Opinions
We assess the effects of the infected population while
the opinion of the healthy population (the “healthy opin-
ion”) is varying in time. Specifically, we allow for oscil-
lations due to generational differences in opinion, so that
line segments in S are explored (this aspect is similar
to a model from Ref. [33]). All parameters may gener-
ally vary with time — here we assume the time-scale of
opinion changes is much shorter than that of population
changes, with the shortest time-scale determined by the
interaction rate: 1/ν < 2pi/ωα  2pi/ωx.
We consider a neutral infected opinion, β = 0, and an
infected opinion favoring behavior 2, β = −0.4. Each
is applied to relative populations x ∈ {0,±0.4}, 50-50
and 70-30 splits of the population. This approaches the
maximum 80-20 split for latent toxoplasmosis[28].
Fig. 3 shows hysteresis loops for β = 0, from nu-
merical solutions of Eqs. (6) with an oscillating opin-
ion α(t) = α0 sin(ωαt). We take ωα = 0.25, corre-
sponding to a period ≈ 25/ν, and α0 = 0.8, a strong
maximum intra-generational agreement in opinion. In-
teraction parameters have little qualitative effect within
the interval κA,B ∈ [0, 1.5], so we use moderate values
κA = κB = 0.7. Larger κA,B as in Eq. (11) gives wider
and steeper loops, reflecting features of a hard ferromag-
net, which still span negative and positive values.
Hysteresis loops for β = −0.4 are shown in Fig. 4. A
50-50 split of the population allows for behaviors y > 0
only for α & 0.2, while a 70-30 infected-healthy split
keeps y < 0 for all α ∈ [−0.8, 0.8]. This suggests a phase
transition occurs when the infected population crosses a
critical value, along with a moderate infected opinion, in
contrast to the typical transition caused by an increase
of the interaction parameter.
FIG. 3: Solution y(t) plotted against the varying opinion
α(t) ∈ [−0.8, 0.8] for β = 0 and κA = κB = 0.7. The ini-
tial path is unimportant and is omitted, leaving just a closed
hysteresis curve for each relative population x.
C. Oscillating Populations
Here we consider the case of an oscillating relative pop-
ulation, exploring line segments in S orthogonal to those
of Sec. III B. We now assume the time-scale of changes in
relative population is much shorter than that of changes
in other parameters, while the shortest time-scale is still
given by the interaction rate: 1/ν < 2pi/ωx  2pi/ωα.
Specifically, we take x(t) = x0 sin(ωxt) with ωx = 0.25
and x0 = 0.6, allowing for an evolution with extrema
representing 80-20 splits of the population.
We consider the following cases: a neutral healthy
opinion with a moderate infected opinion, α = 0 and
β = −0.4, for a selection of interactions on the line
κA + κB = 1.4; and opposite opinions, α = 0.4 and
β = −0.4, with interactions κA ≥ κB on the line
κA + κB = 2.2.
These cases illustrate how the net behavior can be
controlled by the infected population and/or opinion to
varying degrees. The neutral healthy opinion necessarily
leads to net behaviors in favor of the infected opinion,
while the opposite opinions typically keep the net be-
havior centered near zero. The interaction parameters
are chosen such that regions before and after the phase
transition are explored (see Figs. 1, 2).
Fig. 5 reveals all hysteresis loops with α = 0 centered
near y ≈ −0.5. The loops reflect a soft hysteresis, due to
the moderate choice κA + κB = 1.4.
Interestingly, a large κA = 1.2 (small κB = 0.2) leads
to a loop with its long axis making a slope opposite to the
5FIG. 4: Hysteresis curves as in Fig. 3 for β = −0.4 and
κA = κB = 0.7. When the majority is infected (x < 0), the
net behavior always agrees with their opinion (y < 0 always).
others, and traversed in the opposite direction. The net
behavior agrees more strongly with the preference of the
infected population when that population is a minority
— even though healthy individuals are neutral in opinion,
they are much more inclined to agree with the status quo
than the infected individuals who, in contrast, act almost
independently. So the net behavior takes more negative
values as x increases, as more (healthy) individuals fall
in line with the established (infected) behavior.
For the case of opinionated healthy individuals, α =
0.4, with a counteracting infected opinion, the net behav-
ior typically agrees with the majority population from a
previous time due to the delay from interactions, shown
in Fig. 6. A symmetric and comparatively hard hystere-
sis loop arises for κA = κB = 1.1, whereas an asymmetric
loop, made steeper as the healthy population increases
and less steep as the infected population increases, arises
for distinct interaction values κA > κB .
A completely different evolution is uncovered for κA 
κB . The initial evolution from y(0) = 0 is retained, and
mimics the saturation and soft reversal of other loops,
but the behavior is thereafter confined to a loop about
y ≈ −0.6. The loop is traversed in the opposite direc-
tion and its axis is sloped downward, which bears sim-
ilarity to the case of Fig. 5 with κA > κB except the
net behavior now agrees more strongly with the infected
opinion despite the opposing healthy opinion. The very
large value κA = 2 has many healthy individuals insisting
upon agreement with the pre-existing majority behavior,
even when the vast majority is healthy (80-20 healthy-
infected) and quite opposed to that behavior. This point
FIG. 5: Net behavior y(t) with parameters α = 0, β = −0.4,
and κA + κB = 1.4. Soft hysteresis loops result, but the loop
for κA = 1.2 is unlike the others: its axis is sloped downward,
and it is traversed in the opposite direction (clockwise). In
that case, the infected behavior is adopted more widely as
the infected population decreases, due to the pressure among
healthy individuals to adopt the established majority behav-
ior and increase uniformity.
is similar to the minority-rule case from Ref. [9] and the
“spiral of silence” from Refs. [23, 24].
If the opinions are made significantly more polar, α =
−β > 0.4, the loop for κA = 2 becomes similar to the oth-
ers. Such strong global opinions may not be reasonable
due to biological and social fluctuations.
IV. DISCUSSION
The net behavior can favor one side over the other
due to an asymmetry in the parameters, or due to a
symmetry-breaking transition under symmetric param-
eters. Either way, any behavior away from y = 0 can
emerge even when the difference in opinions is modest,
|α− β| . 1. The system is trapped with y < 0 when the
infected population is the majority, even with moderate
interactions κA+κB ∼ 1.4. This also occurs when the in-
fected population is smaller or dynamic, but only if inter-
actions are sufficiently large and far apart: κA + κB & 2
and κA  κB or κA  κB .
The conjectured far-reaching societal effects arising
from toxoplasmosis[17, 21, 36] are possible, although we
found that the infected population must be the majority
at some moment for it to be impactful. The role of inter-
actions has given rise to delays from hysteresis: the net
behavior now reflects the population and opinion split
6FIG. 6: Behavior y(t) with α = 0.4, β = −0.4, and κA+κB =
2.2. Hard hysteresis loops result for κA ≤ 1.55. The initial
evolution is retained for κA = 2 since the system is later
trapped in a loop with y < 0. This case resembles the down-
sloped loop of Fig. 5, again due to the large social pressure
for uniformity among healthy individuals.
that was present some time ago. This delay grants some
power to the infected opinion since the net behavior can
be controlled by the appearance of a majority infected
population, even if it doesn’t persist at all.
The most extreme case of the infected opinion taking
control of the system is when one interaction parameter
is so large that it amounts to authoritarian pressure for
uniformity. Once the net behavior favors the infected
opinion even slightly, the system is forever trapped in
favor of it indefinitely, and actually worsens when the
infected population decreases. This extreme case is per-
haps unrealistic, unless a strict authoritarian uniformity
is enforced by government or culture, but it shows the
point at which interactions grossly exacerbate the pres-
ence of an infected population.
The simple model employed in this work cannot be
trusted for all details, but it is sufficiently general that it
can be applied to any problem with two different subpop-
ulations of individuals undergoing transitions between
binary behaviors[2, 5, 8, 9, 20]. It could be applied to
explore differences in opinions and interactions due to
gender, race, economic background, or any dyad of popu-
lations. The form of Eqs. (5) is also equivalent to a phys-
ical problem of mean-field magnetism, with two species
of particles (spins) which respond to distinct magnetic
fields ∼ α, β, and respond differently to the mean field y.
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